What is the impact of stock market contagion on an investor's portfolio choice? by Branger, Nicole et al.
  JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT 
FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
FACHBEREICH WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN
 
  
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES: FINANCE & ACCOUNTING
 
Nicole Branger / Holger Kraft / Christoph Meinerding 
 
What is the Impact of Stock Market Contagion 
on an Investor's Portfolio Choice? 
 
 
No. 198 
February 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NICOLE BRANGER
* / HOLGER KRAFT
† / CHRISTOPH MEINERDING
‡ 
 
 
 
WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF STOCK MARKET CONTAGION 
ON AN INVESTOR'S PORTFOLIO CHOICE? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 198 
February 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1434-3401 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Finance Center Münster, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Universitätsstr. 14-16, D-48143 
Münster, Germany. Email: Nicole.Branger@wiwi.uni-muenster.de. 
† Department of Finance, Goethe-University, D-60054 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, E-mail: 
holgerkraft@finance.uni-frankfurt.de 
‡ Finance Center Münster, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Universitätsstr. 14-16, D-48143 
Münster, Germany. Email: Christoph.Meinerding@wiwi.uni-muenster.de. 
 
The working papers in the series Finance and Accounting are intended to make research findings available to other 
researchers in preliminary form, to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication. Opinions are 
solely those of the authors 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Stocks are exposed to the risk of sudden downward jumps. Additionally, a crash in one 
stock (or index) can increase the risk of crashes in other stocks (or indices). Our paper 
explicitly takes this contagion risk into account and studies its impact on the portfolio 
decision of a CRRA investor both in complete and in incomplete market settings. We find 
that the investor significantly adjusts his portfolio when contagion is more likely to occur. 
Capturing the time dimension of contagion, i.e. the time span between jumps in two stocks 
or stock indices, is thus of first-order importance when analyzing portfolio decisions. 
Investors ignoring contagion completely or accounting for contagion while ignoring its 
time dimension suffer large and economically significant utility losses. These losses are 
larger in complete than in incomplete markets, and the investor might be better off  if he 
does not trade derivatives. Furthermore, we emphasize that the risk of contagion has a 
crucial impact on investors' security demands, since it reduces their ability to diversify their 
portfolios. 
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 1 Introduction and Motivation
The notion of contagion in nancial markets refers to a phenomenon where losses in one
asset, one asset class, or one country increase the risk of subsequent losses in other assets,
other asset classes, or other countries. Contagion may arise due to rm-specic relations,
e.g. dependency on a main customer, due to the exposure to common macroeconomic risk
factors, e.g. interest rates, or due to psychological reasons, e.g. bank runs.1 One example
for an event inducing contagion is the recent subprime crisis that has been threatening
the nancial markets all over the world: When real estate prices in the US started to
decrease, homeowners who had borrowed heavily against the equity in their homes were
suddenly realizing that they could no longer aord to keep up their mortgage payments.
An estimate from December 2007 states that \subprime borrowers will probably default
on 220 billion { 450 billion of mortgages".2 Initially, this threat has had a signicant
eect on the markets for structured credit contracts like Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs) leading to huge losses that the banks have started to report. All along the way,
the fear has extended into equity markets:
\Fears about an end to the leveraged buy-out boom triggered heavy selling of
global equities yesterday, leading to the FTSE 100's worst one-day slide for
more than four years. [...] The FTSE 100 fell more than 200 points, or 3.2%,
to 6.251,2; its biggest drop since March 2003 in the run-up to the Iraq war.
[...] By early afternoon in New York, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was
down more than 300 points, or 2.4%." (FT, July 27, 2007)
\'In this sort of climate it is all about sentiment, not about the numbers at
all, and sentiment at present is all about fear and nervousness,' said Kevin
Gardiner, head of global equity strategy at HSBC." (WSJ, July 27, 2007)
or as catchily summarized:
\The grievous experience of two centuries of nancial busts is that when the
banking system is in diculties the mess spreads." (Economist, Dec 19, 2007)
These examples show how losses in one part of the economy or in one country can spread
out into other parts of the economy or other countries.
1The relevance of contagion is empirically documented in Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) and Boyson,
Stahel, and Stulz (2007).
2See Economist, Dec 19 2007.
1Our paper analyzes the optimal portfolio choice of a CRRA investor in a stock market
exposed to contagion risk. The stock prices in our economy follow jump-diusion processes.
Large losses in the stocks are captured by downward jumps. Additionally, we take the
above-described empirical fact into account that large losses in one asset can increase
the risk of subsequent large losses in the same or other assets. Therefore, in contrast
to papers that model contagion by an increase in the correlation between the diusion
components, we concentrate on the dependence between these large downward jumps. To
capture this dependence, we build in a Markov chain with two states, a calm state and a
contagion state. In the calm state, the probability of downward jumps is rather low, while
it increases when the economy enters the contagion state. Downward jumps in the calm
state can (but need not) trigger a jump of the economy into the contagion state. On the
other hand, a jump back into the calm state occurs without a jump in stock prices.
Our approach allows us to capture two stylized facts at the same time: Firstly, conta-
gion is not a \one time event" in the sense that it occurs, leads to immediate losses in
several stocks, but has no longer-lasting impact. Usually, the probability for subsequent
crashes remains higher for some time. This time dimension of contagion implies that an
investor can adjust his portfolio when the threat of contagion becomes apparent. Sec-
ondly, contagion is usually triggered by an initial crash in a particular market, i.e. the
jump into the contagion state occurs when some asset prices drop. Put dierently, our
approach allows to correlate the jump processes of two stocks where correlation is induced
by jumps themselves. This is not possible if stock dynamics depend on ordinary Poisson
or Cox processes. Note that Cox processes are correlated, but the correlation results from
diusion processes that drive the corresponding intensities. Therefore, the probabilities
for jumps change only gradually over time. This is in contrast to our approach where the
probabilities for jumps in stock prices can jump themselves.
Our paper is related to the literature on continuous-time portfolio choice starting with
Merton (1969, 1971). There are two approaches to deal with contagion eects in portfolio
problems. One strand of the literature models contagion as joint Poisson jumps. Papers in
this area include Das and Uppal (2004) and Kraft and Steensen (2008), among others.
Their approaches however disregard the time dimension of contagion. In particular, the
probability of subsequent crashes remains the same after a joint jump has happened.
This is because Poisson processes are memoryless (Markov property). Therefore, in this
framework, one cannot study the investors' reactions on the advent of contagion. The
second strand of the literature are so-called regime-switching models. Papers in this area
include Ang and Bekaert (2002) and Guidolin and Timmermann (2007, 2008), among
others. Although these models capture the time dimension of contagion, regime shifts are
2triggered by an exogenous process and do not occur as the result of crashes in certain
assets.
Our paper generalizes Kraft and Steensen (2009) to stock markets and addresses the
following points:3 Firstly, we solve for the optimal stock demands in the calm and in the
contagion state both in a complete and in an incomplete market. We show that there is a
hedging demand for those jumps that trigger the economy to switch the state. The sign
of this hedging demand depends on the investment opportunities in both states and on
the risk aversion of the investor relative to the log investor. Furthermore, we compare the
optimal portfolios in the calm and in the contagion state. It turns out that the investor
revises his portfolio signicantly when the economy changes its state. The sizes of these
portfolio revisions depend on the dierences between the calm and the contagion state,
while their signs depend on the market prices of risk.
Secondly, we analyze the utility loss an investor suers from if he ignores contagion or if he
ignores the time dimension of contagion. We show that the utility loss due to model mis-
specication can be signicant. This is particularly true when the market is completed by
derivatives. In this case, an investor with a rather low risk aversion of 1.5 might annually
lose more than 20% when he makes his decision based on an incorrect model. If the
calm and contagion state dier signicantly, then the utility loss is largest if the investor
ignores contagion completely. For smaller dierences, the utility losses are the largest if
he only ignores the time dimension of contagion. Applying the latter model also results in
the largest losses if the market is incomplete. These losses are however smaller than in a
complete market, where the investor does not only suer from basing his portfolio decision
on an incorrect model, but also from implementing his (seemingly) optimal strategy using
an incorrect pricing model for the derivatives. The utility loss from this second mistake can
become so large that it more than osets the utility gain from having access to derivatives.
Therefore, the investor might be better o if he does not trade derivatives at all.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and
the portfolio planning problem. The optimal portfolios both in complete and incomplete
markets are derived in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze two benchmark models where
the investor either completely ignores contagion or just its time dimension. Section 5
provides some numerical examples, discusses the impact of model mis-specication, and
provides some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. All proofs can be found in the
Appendix.
3From a theoretical point of view, our paper extensively looks at incomplete markets. From an eco-
nomical point of view, we analyze the economic value of derivatives. Both aspects are not considered by
Kraft and Steensen (2009).
32 Model Setup
2.1 The Economy
We consider an economy where uncertainty is described by the complete ltered proba-
bility space (
;P;F;fFtgt2[0;T]) and F = FT. To rule out arbitrage, we assume that an
equivalent martingale measure Q exists under which discounted asset prices are (local)
martingales.4 Our economy is characterized by eight states that will be specied below.
Let Z(t) denote the state at time t 2 [0;T ] and let Z be a right-continuous process with
left limits (RCLL). Then the associated 8-dimensional counting process N = (Nk)k is an
RCLL process, where Nk counts the number of transitions into state k, i.e.
N
k(t) = #fsjs 2 (0;t];Z(s ) 6= k;Z(s) = kg:
Investors can borrow and lend using a money market account with dynamics
dM(t) = M(t)rdt; M(0) = 1;
where, for simplicity, the interest rate r is assumed to be constant.5 Besides, there are
two stocks A and B with jump-diusion dynamics (i 2 fA;Bg)
dSi(t)
Si(t)
= 
Z(t)
i dt + 
Z(t)
i dWi(t)  
X
k6=Z(t)
L
Z(t);k
i dN
k(t);
where WA and WB denote correlated Brownian motions. Their correlation is given by Z,
i.e. we allow for a state dependent correlation of diusive risk. The Brownian motions
capture normal stock price movements. Additionally, there can be sudden large losses
upon transition from one state into another state of economy. For instance, L
j;k
i denotes
the loss of stock i if the economy jumps from state j into state k. It is assumed that for
xed i, j, and k the loss sizes are constant, but this assumption can be relaxed.6
We interpret the states of the economy as calm and contagion states. In our model,
these states mainly dier with respect to the jump intensities. While the jump intensi-
ties are low in a calm state, they increase when the economy enters a contagion state.
Formally, contagion is modeled using a Markov chain that jumps from state j into state
4See Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994) for the essential equivalence
of the existence of such a measure and the absence of arbitrage.
5Our analysis can easily be generalized to stochastic interest rates along the lines of Korn and Kraft
(2001) and Munk and Soerensen (2004), among others.
6Note that in our notation L
j;k
i > 0 corresponds to a loss.
4k with intensity j;k, j 6= k. As mentioned above, we use a Markov chain with eight
states fcontA1;contA2;contB1;contB2;calmA1;calmA2;calmB1;calmB2g that is illustrated
in Figure 1. The rst subscript of the state indicates the stock that has exhibited the most
recent downward jump. The second subscript comes from the fact that we also wish to
model stock price jumps not leading to regime shifts. For instance, if stock A jumps with-
out leaving the calm state, then the Markov chain jumps from state calmA1 to calmsA2,
or vice versa.
The intensity of a jump in stock i that does not trigger contagion is 
calm;calm
i , and the
corresponding loss in stock i is L
calm;calm
i (the loss in the other stock is zero). The intensity
of a jump in stock i that does trigger contagion is 
calm;cont
i and the loss of stock i for
such a jump is L
calm;cont
i . If the economy is in a contagion state, the intensity for a loss in
stock i is 
cont;cont
i , and the corresponding loss size is L
cont;cont
i . After spending some time
in the contagion state, the economy will eventually jump back into the calm state. The
intensity for this to happen is cont;calm, and it is assumed that this event does not induce
any losses in stocks, i.e. L
cont;calm
i  0, i 2 fA;Bg. The intensities for all other jumps are
equal to zero.
To summarize, the Markov chain has four contagion states and four calm states. We
assume that the model parameters coincide in all calm states and in all contagion states.
This implies that all calm states and all contagion states are identical in the sense that
optimal portfolios and indirect utilities are the same. As explained above, the use of four
contagion and four calm states is for technical reasons only.
Finally, we specify the drift and the risk premia of the stocks. The drift of stock i is equal
to

Z(t)
i = r + 
Z(t)
i +
X
k6=Z(t)
L
Z(t);k
i 
Z(t);k
where the last term is the compensator of the jump processes. The risk premium of the
stock is thus given by

Z(t)
i = 
Z(t)
i 
Z(t)
i +
X
k6=Z(t)
L
Z(t);k
i 
Z(t);k
Z(t);k
where 
j
i is the premium for diusive risk Wi when the economy is in state j, and j;k is
the premium for jumps from j into k. The intensity for a jump from j into k under the
risk neutral measure is thus (1 + j;k) times the intensity under the physical measure.
With our denition of the Markov chain, the risk premium only depends on whether the
economy is in one of the calm or in one of the contagion states. Consequently, the risk
5premia of stock i can be rewritten as

calm
i = 
calm
i 
calm
i + L
calm;calm
i 
calm;calm
i 
calm;calm
i + L
calm;cont
i 
calm;cont
i 
calm;cont
i

cont
i = 
cont
i 
cont
i + L
cont;cont
i 
cont;cont
i 
cont;cont
i :
Apart from stocks and the money market account, the investor might also have access to
derivatives. We assume that there are either no derivatives at all, or enough derivatives to
complete the market. The exposure of the derivatives to the risk factors can be calculated
using Ito's lemma.
2.2 The Investor
We consider an investor with CRRA-utility u(c) = c1 

1 
 ; where 
 > 0 denotes his relative
risk aversion. The investor's planning horizon is denoted by T < T , and it is assumed
that he maximizes expected utility from terminal wealth XT only. Therefore, his time-t
indirect utility in state j is dened as
G
j(t;Xt) = max
2Aj(t;Xt)
fE [u(XT)jZ(t) = j]g;
where Aj(t;Xt) denotes the set of all trading strategies  for a current wealth level of Xt
that are admissible at time t in state j.
3 Asset Allocation
3.1 Complete Market
In a complete market, the investor can separate his decision upon the optimal exposures to
the risk factors from nding the strategy that implements these exposures. Generalizing
an idea of Liu and Pan (2003) to our Markov chain framework, the investor's budget
restriction reads
dX(t)
X(t)
= rdt + 
Z(t)
A (t)
h
dWA(t) + 
Z(t)
A dt
i
+ 
Z(t)
B (t)
h
dWB(t) + 
Z(t)
B dt
i
(1)
+
X
k6=Z(t);Z(t);k6=0

Z(t);k(t)

dN
k(t)   
Z(t);kdt   
Z(t);k
Z(t);kdt

;
where 
j
i denotes the investor's state-j exposure to diusive risk Wi and j;k is his exposure
to a jump from state j into state k. In a calm state, we have to choose the four exposures
6to jumps in stock A and stock B that (do not) induce contagion, and we denote these
exposures by 
calm;cont
i (
calm;calm
i ). In the contagion state, we have to choose the three
exposures to jumps in stock A, jumps in stock B, and jumps back from the contagion
into the calm state. These exposures are denoted by 
cont;cont
i and cont;calm. The portfolio
planning problem of the investor is given by
G
j(t;Xt) = max
f
j
A(s);
j
B(s);j;k(s);ts<Tg
E [u(XT)jZ(t) = j]
subject to the budget restriction (1).
The following proposition shows how the optimal exposures to diusion risk, i
A=B, and
to jump risk, 
i;j
A=B, are linked to the model parameters.
Proposition 3.1 (Contagion, Complete Market) In an economy with contagion, the
optimal exposures to the risk factors are

j
A =

j
A   j
j
B

(1   (j)2)

j
B =

j
B   j
j
A

(1   (j)2)

calm;calm
A = (1 + 
calm;calm
A )
  1

   1 
calm;calm
B = (1 + 
calm;calm
B )
  1

   1

calm;cont
A = (1 + 
calm;cont
A )
  1

 fcont
fcalm   1 
calm;cont
B = (1 + 
calm;cont
B )
  1

 fcont
fcalm   1

cont;cont
A = (1 + 
cont;cont
A )
  1

   1 
cont;cont
B = (1 + 
cont;cont
B )
  1

   1

cont;calm = (1 + 
cont;calm)
  1

 fcalm
fcont   1:
The indirect utility function of the investor is
G
j(t;x) =
x1 

1   

 
f
j(t)

 (2)
where  
fcalm(t)
fcont(t)
!
= exp
( 
Ccalm;calm Ccalm;cont
Ccont;calm Ccont;cont
!
(T   t)
) 
1
1
!
7with
C
calm;calm =
1   




r +
(calm
A )2 + (calm
B )2   2calmcalm
A calm
B
2
(1   (calm)2)
+

1 + 
calm;calm
A  
1
1   



calm;calm
A +

1 + 
calm;calm
B  
1
1   



calm;calm
B
+

1 + 
calm;cont
A  
1
1   



calm;cont
A +

1 + 
calm;cont
B  
1
1   



calm;cont
B

+

1 + 
calm;calm
A
1  1



calm;calm
A +

1 + 
calm;calm
B
1  1



calm;calm
B
C
calm;cont =

1 + 
calm;cont
A
1  1



calm;cont
A +

1 + 
calm;cont
B
1  1



calm;cont
B
C
cont;cont =
1   




r +
(cont
A )2 + (cont
B )2   2contcont
A cont
B
2
(1   (cont)2)
+

1 + 
cont;cont
A  
1
1   



cont;cont
A +

1 + 
cont;cont
B  
1
1   



cont;cont
B
+

1 + 
cont;calm  
1
1   



cont;calm

+
 
1 + 
cont;cont
A
1  1

 
cont;cont
A +
 
1 + 
cont;cont
B
1  1

 
cont;cont
B
C
cont;calm =
 
1 + 
cont;calm1  1

 
cont;calm:
The proof is given in Appendix A.1.
Following Merton (1971), the optimal exposures can be decomposed into a speculative
demand and a hedging demand. The demand for diusive risk is purely speculative, since
diusive risk does not have any impact on the investment opportunity set. It depends on
the risk premia (and the correlations) only. The optimal exposure to jump risk is more
involved. The speculative demand for a jump from state old to state new (where the two
states might coincide) is given by
(1 + 
old;new)
  1

   1:
If the market price of jump risk old;new is positive, jumps are more likely under the risk-
neutral measure than under the true measure, and the optimal exposure to this kind of
jumps is negative. In line with intuition, it increases in absolute terms in the risk premium,
and it decreases in absolute terms in risk aversion. The second part of the demand for
jump risk is the hedging demand, which is given by
(1 + 
old;new)
  1



fnew
fold   1

:
8It diers from zero only if the old and the new state are not equal, i.e. if the economy
changes from calm to contagion or vice versa. In this case, the investor takes changes in
the investment opportunity set into account, where his reaction to these changes depends
on whether he is more or less risk-averse than the log-investor, as explained in Kim and
Omberg (1996), Liu and Pan (2003) or Liu, Longsta, and Pan (2003), among others. For
fnew > fold, the induced hedging demand is positive. If 
 > 1, fnew > fold implies that
investment opportunities are worse in the new state than in the old state (see Equation
(2)). The investor is more risk-averse than the log investor, he cares about hedging, and
he wants to have more wealth in those states of the world where investment opportunities
are bad. This results in a positive hedging demand. If 
 < 1, fnew > fold implies that
investment opportunities are better in the new state than in the old state. The investor
is less risk-averse than the log investor and he speculates on changes in the investment
opportunity set. He thus wants to have more wealth in the good new state, and the
induced 'hedging demand' is positive.
To assess how good the investment opportunities in state j are, we rely on the certainty
equivalent return (CER). It is dened by
G
j(t;x) =

xeCERj(t;x)(T t)
1 

1   

:
The CER gives the deterministic return on wealth that would result in the same indirect
utility as the optimal investment in the risky assets.
When the economy changes from the calm state to the contagion state (or vice versa),
the indirect utility of the investor changes due to two reasons. First, his wealth changes
where the loss or gain depends on his exposure towards the jump. Second, the investment
opportunity set and thus the CER changes. Consider, e.g., the case where the optimal
exposure to a jump from the calm into the contagion state is negative. If the investment
opportunities are worse in the contagion state, then the investor will be worse o after the
jump has occurred. If, on the other hand, the investment opportunities are better in the
contagion state, then the overall impact on the indirect utility depends on the trade-o
between the lower wealth and the higher CER.
3.2 Incomplete Market
If the investor can only trade in the two stocks and in the money market account, the
market is incomplete. The budget restriction then becomes
dX(t)
X(t)
= 
Z(t)
A (t)
dSA(t)
SA(t)
+ 
Z(t)
B (t)
dSB(t)
SB(t)
+

1   
Z(t)
A (t)   
Z(t)
B (t)

rdt;
9where 
j
i(t) is the proportion of wealth invested in stock i (i = A;B) at time t and in
state j. The optimal portfolio strategy is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 (Contagion, Incomplete Market) In an economy with contagion
where only the two stocks and the money market account are traded, the investor's in-
direct utility in state j 2 fcalm;contg is
G
j(t;x) =
x1 

1   

f
j(t)
where fj solves the ordinary dierential equations
0 = f
calm
t + (1   
)

r + 
calm
A (
calm
A   r) + 
calm
B (
calm
B   r)

f
calm (3)
  0:5
(1   
)

(
calm
A 
calm
A )
2 + (
calm
B 
calm
B )
2 + 2
calm
A 
calm
B 
calm
A 
calm
B 
calm
f
calm
+ 
calm;cont
A

(1   
calm
A LA)
1 
f
cont   f
calm
+ 
calm;calm
A

(1   
calm
A LA)
1 
   1

f
calm
+ 
calm;cont
B

(1   
calm
B LB)
1 
f
cont   f
calm
+ 
calm;calm
B

(1   
calm
B LB)
1 
   1

f
calm
0 = f
cont
t + (1   
)

r + 
cont
A (
cont
A   r) + 
cont
B (
cont
B   r)

f
cont (4)
  0:5
(1   
)

(
cont
A 
cont
A )
2 + (
cont
B 
cont
B )
2 + 2
cont
A 
cont
B 
cont
A 
cont
B 
cont
f
cont
+ 
cont;cont
A

(1   
cont
A LA)
1 
   1

f
cont + 
cont;cont
B

(1   
cont
B LB)
1 
   1

f
cont
+ 
cont;calm(f
calm   f
cont):
and where the optimal portfolio weights solve

calm
A   r   
(
calm
A )
2
calm
A   

calm
B 
calm
A 
calm
B 
calm
 LA
calm;cont
A (1   
calm
A LA)
 
 fcont
fcalm   LA
calm;calm
A (1   
calm
A LA)
 
 = 0 (5)

calm
B   r   
(
calm
B )
2
calm
B   

calm
A 
calm
A 
calm
B 
calm
 LB
calm;cont
B (1   
calm
B LB)
 
 fcont
fcalm   LB
calm;calm
B (1   
calm
B LB)
 
 = 0 (6)

cont
A   r   
(
cont
A )
2
cont
A   

cont
B 
cont
A 
cont
B 
cont   LA
cont;cont
A (1   
cont
A LA)
 
 = 0 (7)

cont
B   r   
(
cont
B )
2
cont
B   

cont
A 
cont
A 
cont
B 
cont   LB
cont;cont
B (1   
cont
B LB)
 
 = 0: (8)
The proof is given in Appendix A.2.
Equations (3), (4), (5), and (6) form a system of so-called dierential-algebraic equations
which can only be solved numerically.
As compared to the complete market, the investor can in general no longer achieve the
optimal exposures, since he is restricted to the package of exposures oered by the two
stocks, as e.g. pointed out in Liu and Pan (2003). As we will show in some numerical
10examples in Section 5, his exposure to some risk factors will thus be too high, while the
exposure to some other risk factors will be too low compared to the complete market case.
The exposure to jumps from the contagion to the calm state plays a special role. Since the
exposure of both stocks to this jump is assumed to be zero, the investor has no exposure
to this jump at all, and he cannot even approximately implement his hedging demand.
4 Simpler Models: Benchmark Cases
We consider two benchmark cases. In the rst case ('no contagion'), the investor ignores
contagion completely. The stocks jump independently of each other, and the jump in-
tensities are constant over time. In the second case ('joint jumps'), studied e.g. by Das
and Uppal (2004), the investor takes contagion into account by assuming that stock price
jumps can only happen simultaneously.
Our model is in between these extreme cases in two respects. First, we assume that some
jumps do not trigger contagion, while other jumps induce contagion. Second, we allow
for a time dimension of contagion. If the economy enters into the contagion state, then
the investor can adjust his portfolio and take a smaller (or larger) position in the risky
assets. In the benchmark model with joint jumps, the jumps happen simultaneously, and
the investor cannot react to the event of contagion any more.
4.1 No Contagion: Independent Downward Jumps
In the rst benchmark case, there is no contagion at all, and downward jumps in the
stocks happen independently of each other. The dynamics of stock i are
dSi(t)
Si(t )
=
h
r + i + Lii | {z }
i
i
dt + idWi(t)   LidNi(t):
The Wiener processes WA and WB are correlated with correlation . Ni is a Poisson
process with intensity i. The risk premium on the stock is
i = i
diff
i + Lii
jump
i
where 
diff
i is the premium for diusion risk and 
jump
i is the premium for jumps. In a
complete market, the investor can again choose the exposures to the risk factors. The
11budget restriction becomes
dX(t)
X(t)
= rdt + 
diff
A (t)
h
dWA(t) + 
diff
A dt
i
+ 
diff
B (t)
h
dWB(t) + 
diff
B dt
i
+ 
jump
A (t)

dNA(t)   Adt   
jump
A Adt

+ 
jump
B (t)

dNB(t)   Bdt   
jump
B Bdt

where 
diff
i is the exposure to diusive risk Wi, and 
jump
i is the exposure to jumps in
stock i. The optimal portfolio exposures are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 (No Contagion, Complete Market) If there are no contagion ef-
fects in the market, the optimal exposures to the risk factors are

diff
A =

diff
A   
diff
B

(1   2)

diff
B =

diff
B   
diff
A

(1   2)

jump
A = (1 + 
jump
A )
  1

   1 
jump
B = (1 + 
jump
B )
  1

   1:
The indirect utility function of the investor is
G(t;x) =
x1 

1   

expf
 C
nc;c  (T   t)g;
where
C
nc;c =
1   



"
r +
(
diff
A )2 + (
diff
B )2   2
diff
A 
diff
B
2
(1   2)
+
 
1 + 
jump
A

A +
 
1 + 
jump
B

B  
1
1   

(A + B)

+
 
1 + 
jump
A
1  1

 A +
 
1 + 
jump
B
1  1

 B:
The proof is given in Appendix B.1.
The investment opportunity set is constant. There is thus speculative demand only. Both
for diusion risk and for jump risk, this speculative demand has the same structure as
in the contagion model discussed in Section 3 and is driven by the risk premia (and the
diusion correlation) only.
The certainty equivalent return is given by


1 
 Cnc;c. It captures how good the investment
opportunities are. In a complete market, it does not depend on asset specic parameters
like stock price volatilities and loss sizes, but only on economy-wide variables like the risk
premia and the jump intensities. Obviously, the certainty equivalent return is increasing
in the risk premia. Furthermore, it is increasing in the jump intensities A and B, which
12is formally shown in Appendix B.2. To get the intuition, notice that the risk premium
the investor earns on his optimal portfolio is increasing in the optimal exposure to jumps
(i.e. the loss in case of a jump), the market prices of jump risk, and the jump intensities
(i.e. the overall amount of jump risk in the market). The CER is thus increasing in these
three variables, too.
In the incomplete market, the investor chooses the optimal weights of the two stocks,
which are given in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.2 (No Contagion, Incomplete Market) If there are no contagion ef-
fects in the market and only the money market account and the two stocks are traded, then
the indirect utility of the investor is given by
G(t;x) =
x1 

1   

exp(C
nc;ic  (T   t));
where
C
nc;ic = (1   
)
h
r + A(A   r) + B(B   r)  


2
(
2
A
2
A + 
2
B
2
B + 2ABAB)
i
+A

(1   ALA)
1 
   1

+ B

(1   BLB)
1 
   1

:
The optimal portfolio weights are given as the unique solution of
A   r   

2
AA   
BAB   LAA(1   ALA)
 
 = 0
B   r   

2
BB   
ABA   LBB(1   BLB)
 
 = 0:
The proof is given in Appendix B.3.
4.2 Joint Downward Jumps
In the second benchmark case, the investor takes contagion into account by assuming that
stock price jumps happen simultaneously. The dynamics for stock i are
dSi(t)
Si(t )
=
h
r + i + Lijoint | {z }
i
i
dt + idWi(t)   LidNjoint(t):
The risk premium on the stock is
i = i
diff
i + Lijoint
jump
joint :
We want the behavior of the individual stocks to be the same in both benchmark cases,
so that only the joint behavior diers. Consequently, we assume that the parameters for
13the individual stocks are the same as in Section 4.1, and we set joint = A = B and

jump
joint = 
jump
A = 
jump
B .
In the complete market, the solution to the portfolio planning problem is given in the
next proposition.
Proposition 4.3 (Joint Downward Jumps, Complete Market) If there are joint
downward jumps, the optimal exposures to the risk factors are

diff
A =

diff
A   
diff
B

(1   2)
; 
diff
B =

diff
B   
diff
A

(1   2)
;

jump
joint = (1 + 
jump
joint )
  1

   1:
The indirect utility function of the investor is
G(t;x) =
x1 

1   

exp


 C
jj;c  (T   t)
	
;
where
C
jj;c =
1   



"
r +
(
diff
A )2 + (
diff
B )2   2
diff
A 
diff
B
2
(1   2)
+
 
1 + 
jump
joint

joint  
1
1   

joint

+
 
1 + 
jump
joint
1  1

 joint:
The optimal exposures depend on the market prices of risk (and on the correlation) only.
With identical parameters for the behavior of the individual stocks, they are thus the
same as in the case of independent jumps. If a jump happens, the investor loses exactly
the same amount of money, no matter whether he assumes independent jumps or joint
jumps. What diers, however, is the optimal portfolio held by the investor. If there are
joint jumps, the portfolio that is optimal with independent jumps would have a jump risk
exposure that is twice as high as optimal. With joint jumps, the investor is thus more
conservative.
The CER is lower with joint jumps than with independent jumps. To get the intuition,
note that the market prices of risk are identical, while the average number of jumps is
twice as large in the case of independent jumps as in the case of joint jumps. Since the
CER increases in the jump intensity and thus in the average number of jumps, it is indeed
smaller with joint jumps.
In the incomplete market, the investor is again restricted to the package of exposures
oered by the stocks. The optimal portfolio is given in the next proposition.
14Proposition 4.4 (Joint Downward Jumps, Incomplete Market) If there are joint
downward jumps and only the money market account and the two stocks are traded, then
the indirect utility of the investor is given by
G(t;x) =
x1 

1   

expfC
jj;ic  (T   t)g;
where
C
jj;ic = (1   
)
h
r + A(A   r) + B(B   r)  


2
(
2
A
2
A + 
2
B
2
B + 2ABAB)
i
+joint

(1   ALA   BLB)
1 
   1

:
The optimal portfolio weights are given as the unique solutions of
A   r   

2
AA   
BAB   LAjoint(1   ALA   BLB)
 
 = 0
B   r   

2
BB   
ABA   LBjoint(1   ALA   BLB)
 
 = 0:
Just as in the model setup without contagion, the investment opportunity set is constant
and the investor does not have a hedging demand in the incomplete market, either.
5 Numerical Results
5.1 Parameter Choice and Model Calibration
We consider a CRRA-investor with a relative risk aversion of 
 = 3 and a planning horizon
of 20 years. The interest rate is set to r = 0:01. The two stocks are assumed to follow
identical processes. We rely on the parameter estimates of Eraker, Johannes, and Polson
(2003) and Broadie, Chernov, and Johannes (2007). Since we want to focus on the impact
of contagion, which is re
ected in the dierence between the jump intensities in the calm
and in the contagion state, all other parameters are assumed to be equal in both states.7
The diusion volatility  is set to 0:15, and the Wiener processes driving the stock price
dynamics are correlated with  = 0:5. The jump intensity in the benchmark models is set
to 1.5, and we calibrate the jump intensities in our contagion model such that the average
long-run jump intensity is equal to 1.5, too. More details on this step of the calibration
will be given below. The loss in case of a jump in one of the stocks is assumed to be
7We also assume a constant riskless rate here although recent experience of the US subprime crisis
suggests something dierent. To keep the numerical results clear and simple, however, we mainly focus
on the impact of jump risk and do not consider market liquidity or related issues.
15constant and set equal to 0:05, which is slightly higher than the estimate provided in
models that also include stochastic volatility. Remember that the loss for a jump back
from the contagion into the calm state equals zero.
The market price of diusion risk is assumed to equal 0:35 in both states. Jumps from
the contagion state back into the calm state are not priced. For the other market prices
of jump risk, we consider two extreme cases. In the rst case (parametrization 1), we
assume that they are identical in all states. This implies a rather high stock price drift in
the contagion state. In the second case (parametrization 2), we assume that the expected
excess stock returns are equal in both states, which results in larger market prices of risk
in the calm state and lower ones in the contagion state. We calibrate the market prices
of jump risk such that the average expected excess return of the stocks is equal to 8:25%
for both parametrizations, which is in line with Broadie, Chernov, and Johannes (2007).
The two benchmark models without contagion and with joint jumps are calibrated such
that the stock price behavior in the benchmark models is as similar as possible to the
behavior in our model. Therefore, we set the local moments in the benchmark models equal
to the long run averages of the local moments in our model. Details of the calibration can
be found in appendix C.
The dierent jump intensities in our model are chosen such that the average number of
jumps per year, which follows from Equation (15), is equal to the benchmark value of 1.5.
Since we want to focus on contagion, we explicitly control for its severeness and thus for
the wedge driven between the two states. The dierence between the jump intensities in
the calm and contagion state is captured by   1:

cont;cont
i = i


calm;calm
i + 
calm;cont
i

i 2 fA;Bg:
The conditional probability that a loss in a stock actually triggers contagion is given by
the parameter :

calm;cont
i = i


calm;calm
i + 
calm;cont
i

i 2 fA;Bg;
and the average time the economy stays in the contagion state depends on  :

cont;calm =  
 

cont;cont
A + 
cont;cont
B

:
Given , , and   and the average jump intensity of 1:5, all other jump intensities can be
calculated. In the base case calibration, we set  = 4,  = 0:5 and   = 0:25. The resulting
parameters are given in Table 1. Table 2 shows the resulting conditional equity risk premia
and variances of stock returns for both parameterizations and in the benchmark models
16as well as their decomposition into diusion and jump components. Table 3 gives some
other combinations of parameters used in robustness checks, where we choose  2 [1;10],
 2 [0:2;0:5] and   2 [0:2;2=3].
5.2 Optimal Exposures and Optimal Portfolios
Table 4 gives the solution to the portfolio planning problem for the base-case parameters
from Table 1 both for the complete and the incomplete market. We discuss the case of
complete markets rst, where the investor can achieve any desired payo prole.
The demand for diusion risk is driven by the speculative component only. It is identical
in the calm and in the contagion state and for both parametrizations, because the market
prices of diusion risk are identical by assumption.
The demand for jump risk can be decomposed into a speculative component and { for
those jumps that change the state { a hedging component. The speculative demand is an
increasing function of the market prices of jump risk 
i;j
A=B. If the market prices of risk are
identical in all states (parametrization 1), the speculative demand does not depend on the
state and coincides with the speculative demand in the two benchmark models. If equity
risk premia are constant (parametrization 2), on the other hand, the market price of risk
is lower in the contagion state than in the calm state, and consequently, the speculative
demand is lower in absolute terms in the contagion state, too. Since jumps from the
contagion state back to the calm state are not priced by assumption, this speculative
demand is zero.
The sign of the hedging demand depends on which of the two states is the better one.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the certainty equivalent returns in both states. If the
market prices of risk are constant (parametrization 1), the investment opportunity set
is better in the contagion state where jumps happen more often than in the calm state.
Given that 
 > 1, the hedging demand for jumps from the calm to the (better) contagion
state is negative, which implies that the investor takes a more aggressive position in jump
risk in the calm state. In the contagion state, on the other hand, his optimal exposure
to jumps back to the (worse) calm state is positive. If the expected returns are equal
(parametrization 2), the calm state is better than the contagion state which switches the
sign of the hedging demands.
The optimal exposures are dierent in the calm and in the contagion state, and the investor
will adjust his portfolio when the state of the economy changes. He thus prots from the
time dimension of contagion captured in our model. His trading desire due to contagion is
17much more pronounced for the case of equal equity risk premia (parametrization 2), where
trading is induced by changes in the market prices of risk and in the hedging demand,
than for the case of identical market prices of risk, where trading is induced by changes
in the hedging demand only.
If the market is incomplete, the investor cannot implement the overall optimal exposures.
As can be seen in Table 4, the realized exposures will be somewhere in between the optimal
exposures from the complete case. The position in risky assets is larger in the state in
which investment opportunities are better, that is in the calm state in case of equal equity
risk premia and in the contagion state in case of equal market prices of risk.
In the benchmark models, the investor does not distinguish between calm and contagion
states. If he ignores contagion completely, the optimal position in stocks is somewhere
in between the optimal positions in the calm and in the contagion state. If the investor
assumes that there are joint jumps, he is more conservative and reduces his optimal
position in stocks signicantly.
The certainty equivalent returns in our model and in the two benchmark models are shown
in the left panel of Figure 2. As expected, the utility loss due to market incompleteness is
largest in our contagion model since the investor fails to implement the optimal myopic
demand as well as the intertemporal hedging demand, whereas a hedging demand does
not exist in both benchmark models. In absolute numbers, the joint jumps model gives the
lowest utility both in an incomplete and in a complete market, since the average number
of jumps is cut in half compared to the other models.
Robustness checks show that the results do not change qualitatively when we vary , 
and  , i.e. the overall size of contagion, the risk of entering the contagion state, and the
(reciprocal of the) average duration of the contagion state. In line with intuition, a larger
dierence between the calm and contagion state, i.e. a larger value of , leads to larger
trading incentives due to changes of the state and to larger utility losses due to market
incompleteness. The probability  of entering the contagion state does not have much
impact on the results. On the other hand, the smaller  , i.e. the longer the economy
stays in the contagion state once it has entered this state, the more extreme the portfolio
weights, exposures and utility functions.
5.3 Model Mis-Specication
If the investor relies on a benchmark model instead of the true model from Section 2.1, he
will not hold the optimal portfolio. In this section, we analyze the utility loss he suers
from due to this suboptimal behavior.
185.3.1 Incomplete Market
In the incomplete market, the investor can only invest into the two stocks and into the
money market account. In case of model mis-specication, he (incorrectly) uses one of the
benchmark models to determine the optimal portfolio. For both these models, the optimal
portfolio weights are constant over time. The indirect utility derived from this strategy is
given in the next proposition.
Proposition 5.1 (Model Mis-Specication, Incomplete Market) In an economy with
contagion where only the two stocks and the money market account are traded and for an
investor who uses the portfolio weights b A;b B, the indirect utility in state j 2 fcalm;contg
is
G
j(t;x) =
x1 

1   

b f
j(t)
where b fj is given by
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The proof is given in Appendix D.1.
The upper panels of Figure 3 and 4 show the certainty equivalent returns in case of
model mis-specication for equal market prices of risk and equal equity risk premia,
respectively. For the base case parametrization, the investor loses up to 20 basis points
a year if he relies on an incorrect model. The losses are larger for equal market prices
of risk (parametrization 1) than for equal equity risk premia (parametrization 2), since
19the dierences in the optimal portfolios between the states which the investor fails to
pick up are larger in the rst case. Surprisingly, the investor is (slightly) worse o if he
assumes joint jumps and thus only ignores the time dimension of contagion than if he
ignores contagion completely. And again, the results, i.e. the utility losses, increase in the
dierence between the calm and contagion state as measured by .
5.3.2 Complete Market
Next, we analyze the impact of model mis-specication if the market is complete. To
determine whether enough derivatives are traded for market completeness, the investor
relies on the benchmark model. In the case of independent jumps, four risky assets are
needed, while in the case of joint jumps, three risky assets are enough. We assume that the
investor uses the two stocks, an ATM-call on stock A with a time to maturity of 3 months,
and { if needed { an identical ATM-call on stock B. These short-term ATM-options are
usually among the most liquid contracts. Note however that the choice of contracts will
have an impact on the utility loss due to model mis-specication.
The analysis of model mis-specication is more complicated than in case of an incomplete
market. In the rst step, the investor determines the seemingly optimal exposures in the
benchmark model. In the second step, he uses the risky assets and their risk exposure
to implement these seemingly optimal exposures, where he (incorrectly) determines the
sensitivities of the derivatives in the benchmark model. Given the seemingly optimal
portfolio, we (but not the investor) can then use the sensitivities from the true model
to determine the realized exposure. Given these realized exposures b , which are again
constant over time, we can then nally calculate the realized indirect utility.
Proposition 5.2 (Model Mis-Specication, Complete Market) In a complete mar-
ket with contagion eects, the utility obtained by an investor who uses the incorrect risk
factor exposures b  is given by
b G
j(t;x) =
x1 

1   

b f
j(t)
where j 2 fcalm;contg and
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:
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The proof is given in Appendix D.2.
The lower panels of Figure 3 and 4 show the certainty equivalent returns when the correct
model is used and when one of the benchmark models is used to determine the (seemingly)
optimal portfolio. The CER losses are highly economically signicant, and they are much
higher than in the incomplete market, since the investor now makes an additional mistake.
To set up the optimal portfolio, he has to convert the optimal exposures into portfolio
weights. While the exposures of the stocks are model independent, the exposures of the
derivatives depend on the model, and an investor using an incorrect model for portfolio
planning will use the same incorrect model for pricing derivatives, too. As can be seen
from the gures, the mistakes in calculating the exposures and in pricing the derivatives
do not cancel each other, but rather add up.
Figure 5 compares the utility losses for dierent values of , where we assume equal equity
risk premia in both states. The results for equal market prices of risk (not shown here)
are qualitatively similar. As can be seen from the graphs, the dierence between the calm
and contagion state has a very large impact on the utility losses. They are already far
from negligible for a rather low value of  = 2, and increase to around 10%-15% a year
21for  = 10. For this high level of , the CER can even become negative, and the investor
would be better o if he just invested his wealth at the risk-free rate only, ignoring all
risky assets.
Dierent from the incomplete market, it now depends on , i.e. on the severeness of
contagion, which of the two benchmark models leads to the smaller utility loss. For low
values of , the investor is still better o if he ignores contagion completely. For higher
values of , however, he is signicantly better o if he just ignores the time dimension of
contagion. In a model with joint jumps, the investor holds less derivatives which lowers
his utility loss due to derivatives mispricing, but increases his utility loss due to a too
conservative portfolio strategy. The exact trade-o between these two arguments depends
on .
An investor who relies on the correct model is obviously better o in the complete market.
In case of model mis-specication, this may no longer be true, as can be seen in Figure 3
and 4. While an investor who incorrectly bases his decisions on a model with joint jumps
is still better o in the complete market, an investor ignoring any contagion might be
better o in the incomplete market. In this case, the utility gain from having access to
derivatives (and thus more payo patterns) is more than oset by the utility loss from
using the incorrect sensitivities and implementing the seemingly optimal strategy in the
wrong way.
We also did a robustness check with respect to  and  , which govern the risk of entering
the contagion state and the average time the economy stays in the contagion state. As
already seen above, the impact of the exact size of these two parameters is rather small,
and the qualitative results do not change.
5.4 Robustness Checks
In the preceding sections, we have shown that contagion has a substantial eect on optimal
exposures, optimal portfolio weights, and the investor's expected utility. Furthermore, an
investor who uses an incorrect model might suer large utility losses in particular in a
complete market where he also uses derivatives. While we have already discussed the
sensitivity of our results with respect to the severeness of contagion, we now do some
additional robustness checks with respect to the risk aversion, the size of the losses, and
the diusion correlation between the stocks.
225.4.1 Relative Risk Aversion
The results up to now have been based on a relative risk aversion of 
 = 3. We have
redone the analysis for values of 
 between 1:5 and 10. In line with intuition, the results
become less extreme the higher the risk aversion and the less the investor therefore invests
in risky assets. The qualitative results, however, do not change.
While the utility losses due to model mis-specication decrease in 
, they are still highly
economically signicant even for a high risk aversion of 
 = 10. The investor is much
more conservative in this case. Nevertheless, the loss in CER can well exceed 8% in the
complete market and is thus far from negligible.
5.4.2 Loss Size
In a second step, we have changed the loss size from L = 0:05 to the more moderate
value of L = 0:03. This has no impact on the results in the complete market, which
are independent of the exact losses in the stocks, but depend only on the intensity of
jumps and their market prices of risk. In the incomplete market, however, the smaller loss
size decreases the utility of the investor, since the package oered by stocks now ts the
optimal exposure even worse. Consequently, the utility loss due to market incompleteness
increases.
The impact of the loss size on the losses due to model mis-specication is mixed. While the
utility loss in the incomplete market and in case the joint jumps model is used decreases
with the lower loss size, the opposite is true in a complete market and in case the investor
relies on a model with no contagion at all. Overall, however, the results do not change
qualitatively when we change the loss size.
5.4.3 Diusion Correlation
As an additional robustness check, we consider dierent values for the diusion correlation
parameter , which was set to  = 0:5 in our base case. We redo the analysis for  = 0
and  =  0:5.
The utility loss due to market incompleteness is smallest for  =  0:5 in our contagion
model. This can be explained by the fact that the package oered by the stocks is closest
to the overall optimal exposure in this case. The result is specic to the parameters used
and will not hold in general.
23Concerning our model mis-specication analysis, it depends on  whether the investor
is better o if he ignores contagion completely or if he just ignores the time dimension
of contagion. To get the intuition, remember that the model with joint jumps leads to a
portfolio that is too conservative, but reduces the impact of calculating the incorrect sen-
sitivities. For  =  0:5, the optimal portfolio includes only a small position in derivatives,
so that the model with joint jumps performs worse than the model with no contagion at
all. For  = 0:5, on the other hand, the investor is better o if he uses the model with joint
jumps, since the position in derivatives is now signicantly larger. Again, the utility loss
due to model mis-specication may exceed the utility gain due to market completeness
if the dierences between the calm and the contagion state are large enough. This again
suggests that the investor may be better o if he does not use derivatives at all instead
of using them in the wrong way.
6 Conclusion
The paper analyzes the optimal portfolio in case of contagion risk. Instead of capturing
contagion by joint jumps in the stocks, we assume that some large loss in stocks can
increase the jump intensities signicantly. This adds a time dimension to contagion. The
investor is thus able to adjust his portfolio when the economy switches its state, and
our results document that he indeed uses this possibility. The direction of the portfolio
adjustment depends on his relative risk aversion and on the market prices of risk.
If the investor incorrectly uses a simpler model, then he suers a utility loss: Surprisingly,
in an incomplete market the investor's utility loss is larger if he assumes joint jumps (and
thus ignores only the time dimension of contagion) than if he ignores contagion completely.
On the other hand, if the investor has also access to derivatives, then his utility loss is
larger if he disregards all aspects of contagion and if the calm and contagion state are
rather distinct. Furthermore, an investor worrying about model mis-specication might
be better o if he does not use derivatives at all, since the utility gain from having access
to derivatives can be more than oset by the utility loss due to using an incorrect model.
There are several directions for future research. First, one can drop the assumption that
the investor can observe the true state of the economy. In this case, he needs to learn about
the current state by observing stock prices over time. He will use a ltering approach to
continuously update the probabilities of being in the two states. Second, we have shown
that the assumptions about the market prices of risk have a signicant impact on the
optimal portfolios. It would thus be interesting to consider a general equilibrium setup in
24which market prices of risk are determined endogenously. This would allow us to analyze
how investors price contagion risk.
25A Contagion
A.1 Complete Market - Proof
We solve the portfolio problem in a complete market for a general Markov chain with states
k 2 f1;:::;Kg. The indirect utility function in state j at time t and for a current wealth
level of x is denoted by Gj(t;x). The functions G must solve the system of Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations, where we have one equation for each state j:
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Subscripts of G denote partial derivatives. We assume constant relative risk aversion, and
rely on the usual guess for the indirect utility function
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Plugging these expressions into the HJB-equations and simplifying gives
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26Solving the rst order conditions for the optimal exposures gives
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We then plug the optimal exposures back into the HJB-equations to get
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The resulting linear system of homogeneous ordinary dierential equations for fj(t) (j =
0;1;2) with boundary condition fj(T) = 1 is
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This is equivalent to
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The system of ordinary dierential equations can thus be written as
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Proposition 3.1 then follows by applying this result to our Markov chain and further
aggregating the formally eight states to the two economic states 'calm' and 'contagion' as
described in section 2.1.
A.2 Incomplete Market - Proof
In the incomplete market, the investor decides on the portfolio weights calm
A and calm
B of
the two stocks. The HJB-equation in the calm state is
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and the HJB-equation in the contagion state is
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With the guess Gj(t;x) = x1 
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28and the HJB-equation in the contagion state becomes
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The rst order conditions for the portfolio weights are
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With the optimal portfolio weights, the dierential equations become
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Conditions (11) and (12) can be solved numerically for the optimal portfolio weights
in the contagion state. Conditions (13),(14),(9) and (10) form a so-called dierential-
algebraic system for the functions fcalm, fcont, calm
A and calm
B . This system can be solved
numerically using a Runge-Kutta method of order 3, namely the implicit Radau form of
order 3, which is for example studied in Hairer, Lubich, and Roche (1989).
29B Benchmark Models: Independent Jumps
B.1 Complete Market - Proof
The model with independent jumps can be interpreted as a special case of the model with
contagion where the parameters are identical in all states. The indirect utility function is
then no longer state dependent. The optimal exposures are
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The ordinary dierential equation for f becomes
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The function f can be solved for in closed form:
f(t) = expfC
nc;c  (T   t)g:
The indirect utility is
G(t;x) =
x1 
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expf
 C
nc;c  (T   t)g:
B.2 Complete Market: Impact of Jump Intensity
Lemma B.1 (Independent Jumps, Complete Market: Impact of Jump Intensity)
If there are no contagion eects and if the market is complete, the indirect utility is in-
creasing in A and B.
30Proof: The partial derivative of G w.r.t. i is
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(
 > 1). Put together, the partial derivative of the indirect utility function with respect
to i is positive, and the indirect utility is increasing in the jump intensity i.
B.3 Incomplete Market - Proof
Again, the model can be interpreted as a special case of the model with contagion. The
guess for the indirect utility function is
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where G does not depend on the state any more. The optimal portfolio weights A and
B satisfy
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which can be solved numerically. The HJB-equation simplies dramatically, and with the
optimal portfolio weights, the dierential equation for f is
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The solution is given by f(t) = expfCnc;ic  (T   t)g.
C Benchmark Models: Calibration
The stationary probability of the calm and contagion state is
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31and we know from the ergodic theorem for Markov chains8 that
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where g is some state-dependent function.
Firstly, we want the stocks to have the same risk in the contagion model and in the
benchmark models. We thus equate the variance of the stock, which gives
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We also equate the jump intensity (for those jumps that result in a loss) and the average
jump size
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Secondly, we want the stocks to have the same expected excess returns. Since the investor
might deal dierently with jump and diusion risk, we also equate the risk premia earned
on stock diusion risk and stock jump risk. This gives two additional restrictions
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D Model Mis-Specication
D.1 Incomplete Market - Model Mis-Specication
In case of model mis-specication, the optimal portfolios are determined in the benchmark
model. With independent jumps, the weights of the stocks are constant over time. The
8See, e.g., Br emaud (2001).
32indirect utility functions in the two states are then given by
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SB(t)
+ (1   b A(t)   b B(t))rdt
where b A and b B denote the seemingly optimal portfolio weights. Since the indirect utility
b G is a martingale, it holds that
0 = b G
calm
t + x(r + b A(
calm
A   r) + b B(
calm
B   r))b G
calm
x
+ 0:5x
2 
(b A
calm
A )
2 + (b B
calm
B )
2 + 2b Ab B
calm
A 
calm
B 
calm b G
calm
xx
+ 
calm;cont
A [b G
cont(t;x(1   b ALA))   b G
calm(t;x)]
+ 
calm;cont
B [b G
cont(t;x(1   b BLB))   b G
calm(t;x)]
+ 
calm;calm
A [b G
calm(t;x(1   b ALA))   b G
calm(t;x)]
+ 
calm;calm
B [b G
calm(t;x(1   b BLB))   b G
calm(t;x)]
and
0 = b G
cont
t + x(r + b A(
cont
A   r) + b B(
cont
B   r))b G
cont
x
+ 0:5x
2 
(b A
cont
A )
2 + (b B
cont
B )
2 + 2b Ab B
cont
A 
cont
B 
cont b G
cont
xx
+ 
cont;calm[b G
calm(t;x)   b G
cont(t;x)]
+ 
cont;cont
A [b G
cont(t;x(1   b ALA))   b G
cont(t;x)]
+ 
cont;cont
B [b G
cont(t;x(1   b BLB))   b G
cont(t;x)]:
Since the investor has constant relative risk aversion, we can use a separation approach
and set
b G
j(t;x) =
x1 

1   

b f
j(t):
Plugging in and simplifying gives
0 = b f
calm
t + (1   
)
 
r + b A(
calm
A   r) + b B(
calm
B   r)
 b f
calm
  0:5
(1   
)
 
(b A
calm
A )
2 + (b B
calm
B )
2 + 2b Ab B
calm
A 
calm
B 
calm b f
calm
+ 
calm;cont
A

(1   b ALA)
1 
 b f
cont   b f
calm

+ 
calm;cont
B

(1   b BLB)
1 
 b f
cont   b f
calm

+ 
calm;calm
A

(1   b ALA)
1 
 b f
calm   b f
calm

+ 
calm;calm
B

(1   b BLB)
1 
 b f
calm   b f
calm

33and
0 = b f
cont
t + (1   
)
 
r + b A(
cont
A   r) + b B(
cont
B   r)
 b f
cont
  0:5
(1   
)
 
(b A
cont
A )
2 + (b B
cont
B )
2 + 2b Ab B
cont
A 
calm
B 
cont b f
cont
+ 
cont;calm

b f
calm   b f
cont

+ 
cont;cont
A

(1   b ALA)
1 
 b f
cont   b f
cont

+ 
cont;cont
B

(1   b BLB)
1 
 b f
cont   b f
cont

:
This results in a system of two linear ordinary dierential equations
 
b fcalm
t
b fcont
t
!
=  
 
b C1;1 b C1;2
b C2;1 b C2;2
! 
b fcalm
b fcont
!
where
b C
1;1 = (1   
)
 
r + b A(
calm
A   r) + b B(
calm
B   r)

  0:5
(1   
)
 
(b A
calm
A )
2 + (b B
calm
B )
2 + 2b Ab B
calm
A 
calm
B 
calm
  
calm;cont
A   
calm;cont
B
+ 
calm;calm
A
 
(1   b ALA)
1 
   1

+ 
calm;calm
B
 
(1   b BLB)
1 
   1

b C
1;2 
calm;cont
A (1   b ALA)
1 
 + 
calm;cont
B (1   b BLB)
1 

b C
2;1 = 
cont;calm
b C
2;2 = (1   
)
 
r + b A(
cont
A   r) + b B(
cont
B   r)

  0:5
(1   
)
 
(b A
cont
A )
2 + (b B
cont
B )
2 + 2b Ab B
cont
A 
calm
B 
cont
  
cont;calm
+ 
cont;cont
A
 
(1   b ALA)
1 
   1

+ 
cont;cont
B
 
(1   b BLB)
1 
   1

:
The solution for b f is
 
b fcalm(t)
b fcont(t)
!
= exp
( 
b C1;1 b C1;2
b C2;1 b C2;2
!
(T   t)
) 
1
1
!
:
D.2 Complete Market - Model Mis-Specication
In case of model mis-specication in a complete market setup, the investor does not
implement his optimal risk factor exposures (t), but sub-optimal exposures b  which are
constant over time. As in A.1, we solve for the indirect utility function for a general
34Markov chain with states k 2 f1;:::;Kg. The indirect utility functions in the K states
are then given by
b G
j(t;x) = Et

X
1 

T
1   

  Xt = x

subject to the budget restriction
dX(t)
X(t)
= rdt + b 
Z(t)
A
h
dWA(t) + 
Z(t)
A dt
i
+ b 
Z(t)
B
h
dWB(t) + 
Z(t)
B dt
i
+
X
k6=Z(t);Z(t);k6=0
b 
Z(t);k 
dN
k(t)   
Z(t);kdt   
Z(t);k
Z(t);kdt

:
Since the indirect utility b G is a martingale, it holds that
0 = b G
j
t + b G
j
xx
"
r + b 
j
A
j
A + b 
j
B
j
B  
X
k6=j
b 
j;k
j;k  
1 + 
j;k
#
+ 0:5G
j
xxx
2
h
(b 
j
A)
2 + (b 
j
B)
2 + 2
jb 
j
Ab 
j
B
i
+
X
k6=j
h
G
k(t;x(1 + b 
j;k))   G
j(t;x)
i

j;k:
Since the investor has constant relative risk aversion, we can use a separation approach
and set
b G
j(t;x) =
x1 

1   

b f
j(t):
Plugging in and simplifying gives a system of linear ordinary dierential equations
0 = b f
j
t + (1   
)
"
r + b 
j
A
j
A + c B
j

j
B  
X
k6=j
b 
j;k
j;k  
1 + 
j;k
#
b f
j
  0:5
(1   
)
h
(b 
j
A)
2 + (b 
j
B)
2 + 2
j b 
j
Ab 
j
B
i
b f
j
+
X
k6=j
h
b f
k(1 + b 
j;k)
1 
   b f
j
i

j;k
)
whose solution with respect to the boundary conditions fj(T) = 1 becomes in our case
 
b fcalm(t)
b fcont(t)
!
= exp
( 
b Ccalm;calm b Ccalm;cont
b Ccont;calm b Ccont;cont
!
(T   t)
) 
1
1
!
35with
b C
calm;calm = (1   
)
h
r + b 
calm
A 
calm
A + b 
calm
B 
calm
B
  b 
calm;calm
A 
calm;calm
A (1 + 
calm;calm
A )   b 
calm;cont
A 
calm;cont
A (1 + 
calm;cont
A )
 b 
calm;calm
B 
calm;calm
B (1 + 
calm;calm
B )   b 
calm;cont
B 
calm;cont
B (1 + 
calm;cont
B )
i
  0:5
(1   
)
h
(b 
calm
A )
2 + (b 
calm
B )
2 + 2
calmb 
calm
A b 
calm
B
i
+ 
calm;calm
A
h
(1 + b 
calm;calm
A )
1 
   1
i
+ 
calm;calm
B
h
(1 + b 
calm;calm
B )
1 
   1
i
  
calm;cont
A   
calm;cont
B
b C
calm;cont = 
calm;cont
A (1 + b 
calm;cont
A )
1 
 + 
calm;cont
B (1 + b 
calm;cont
B )
1 

b C
cont;calm = 
cont;calm(1 + b 
cont;calm)
1 

b C
cont;cont = (1   
)
h
r + b 
cont
A 
cont
A + b 
cont
B 
cont
B
  b 
cont;cont
A 
cont;cont
A (1 + 
cont;cont
A )   b 
cont;cont
B 
cont;cont
B (1 + 
cont;cont
B )
 b 
cont;calm
cont;calm(1 + 
cont;calm)
i
  0:5
(1   
)
h
(b 
cont
A )
2 + (b 
cont
B )
2 + 2
contb 
cont
A b 
cont
B
i
+ 
cont;cont
A
h
(1 + b 
cont;cont
A )
1 
   1
i
+ 
cont;cont
B
h
(1 + b 
cont;cont
B )
1 
   1
i
  
cont;calm:
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38Our model Benchmark model
Paramet- Paramet- Paramet- Paramet-
rization 1 rization 2 rization 1 rization 2
Data-generating calm
A 0.15 A 0.1515 0.15
process cont
A 0.15
calm 0.50  0.50 0.50
cont 0.50

calm;calm
A 0.375 A/joint 1.50 1.50

calm;cont
A 0.375

cont;cont
A 3.000
cont;calm 1.500
L
calm;calm
A 0.05 LA 0.05 0.05
L
calm;cont
A 0.05
L
cont;cont
A 0.05
L
cont;calm
A 0.00
A 4.00
A 0.50
  0.25
Market prices calm
A 0.35 0.35 
diff
A 0.3466 0.35
of risk cont
A 0.35 0.35

calm;calm
A 0.40 0.80 
jump
A 0.40 0.40

calm;cont
A 0.40 0.80

cont;cont
A 0.40 0.20
cont;calm 0.00 0.00
Table 1: Parameters
The table gives the parameters for the stocks under the physical measure (upper part)
and the market prices of risk (lower part) for our base case as explained in Section 5.1.
The two stocks are assumed to follow identical processes, so that we only give the param-
eters for stock A. The market prices of risk in our model are chosen such that either the
market prices of jump risk are identical in the calm and the contagion state (parametriza-
tion 1) or such that the expected excess return on the stock is identical in both states
(parametrization 2). The parameters written in bold numbers have been set in line with
recent empirical studies. The jump intensities in our model (written in italic numbers)
have been set in the second step. All other numbers have been calibrated in a third step
such that the average equity risk premium is identical for both parametrizations (market
prices of risk) or such that the benchmark models are as close as possible to our model.
39our model benchmark
calm contagion
Parametrization 1 Excess Return 0.0675 0.1125 0.0825
(identical market ... from diusion 0.0525 0.0525 0.0525
prices of risk) ... from jumps 0.0150 0.0600 0.0300
Variance 0.0244 0.0300 0.0267
... from diusion 0.0225 0.0225 0.0230
... from jumps 0.0019 0.0075 0.0038
Parametrization 2 Excess Return 0.0825 0.0825 0.0825
(identical equity ... from diusion 0.0525 0.0525 0.0525
risk premium) ... from jumps 0.0300 0.0300 0.0300
Variance 0.0244 0.0300 0.0263
... from diusion 0.0225 0.0225 0.0225
... from jumps 0.0019 0.0075 0.0038
Table 2: Conditional Moments
The table gives the conditional expected excess returns and the conditional variances of
stock returns in the calm and in the contagion state as well as in the benchmark models
for the parameter set from Table 1. Furthermore, we show the contribution of diusion
risk and jump risk to the local moments. For parametrization 1, the market prices of risk
are assumed to be equal in the calm and in the contagion state, while for parametrization
2, the expected excess returns are equal across states.
40contagion parameters calibrated jump parameters
A/joint A A   
calm;calm
A 
calm;cont
A 
cont;cont
A cont;calm
no contagion 1.50 1 0.50 0.25 0.75000 0.75000 1.50 0.75
1.50 2 0.50 0.25 0.50000 0.50000 2.00 1.00
base case 1.50 4 0.50 0.25 0.37500 0.37500 3.00 1.50
1.50 10 0.50 0.25 0.30000 0.30000 6.00 3.00
1.50 4 1/3 1/3 0.62500 0.31250 3.75 2.50
1.50 10 1/3 1/3 0.55000 0.27500 8.25 5.50
1.50 4 0.20 0.20 0.75000 0.18750 3.75 1.50
1.50 10 0.20 0.20 0.66000 0.16500 8.25 3.30
1.50 4 0.50 0.50 0.46875 0.46875 3.75 3.75
1.50 10 0.50 0.50 0.41250 0.41250 8.25 8.25
1.50 4 1/3 2/3 0.75000 0.37500 4.50 6.00
1.50 10 1/3 2/3 0.70000 0.35000 10.50 14.00
Table 3: Selection of calibrated jump parameters
Each line of the table shows one possible combination of contagion and jump parameters
leading to an 'average' (i.e. benchmark) jump intensity of 1.5. The line marked 'no con-
tagion' describes a situation where the calm and the contagion state equal (since  equals
1). The line marked 'base case' shows the parameters for our base case parameter set also
described in Table 1.
41our model benchmark models
calm cont no cont joint
Parametrization 1: identical market prices of risk
complete Di-Exposure 0.0778 0.0778 0.0770 0.0770
Jump-Exposure
no change of state -0.1061 -0.1061 -0.1061 -0.1061
change of state -0.1307 0.0284
hedging demand < 0 > 0 0 0
incomplete A 0.6388 0.8934 0.7150 0.6396
Di-Exposure 0.0958 0.1340 0.1083 0.0968
Jump-Exposure
no change of state -0.0319 -0.0447 -0.0358 -0.0640
change of state -0.0319 0
Parametrization 2: identical expected excess returns
complete Di-Exposure 0.0778 0.0778 0.0778 0.0778
Jump-Exposure
no change of state -0.1779 -0.0590 -0.1061 -0.1061
change of state -0.1601 -0.0212
hedging demand > 0 < 0 0 0
incomplete A 0.7671 0.6583 0.7277 0.6495
Di-Exposure 0.1151 0.0988 0.1092 0.0974
Jump-Exposure
no change of state -0.0384 -0.0329 -0.0364 -0.0649
change of state -0.0384 0
Table 4: Optimal Portfolios/Exposures
The table shows the optimal portfolios for our model and for the two benchmark models
in a complete and in an incomplete market for a planning horizon of 20 years and for the
benchmark parameters of Table 1. For the complete market, we give the optimal exposures
to diusion risk and the optimal exposure to jumps that (do not) induce a change from
calm to contagion or vice versa. For the incomplete market, we give the optimal weight
of stock A, as well as the induced exposures to the risk factors. Since the weights of stock
B and the exposures to risk factors related to stock B coincide with those for stock A, we
only show the results for A.
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43Parametrization 1: equal market prices of risk
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Figure 2: Certainty Equivalent Returns
The gures show the certainty equivalent returns as a function of the planning horizon
for the case of equal market prices of risk (upper row) and equal equity risk premia (lower
row) in the calm and in the contagion state as well as in the benchmark cases. The results
for the incomplete market are given in the left column, the results for the complete one
in the right column. The solid blue lines give the certainty equivalent returns in the calm
state, the dashed red lines the certainty equivalent returns in the contagion state. The
dash-dotted green lines denote the certainty equivalent returns in the benchmark case
with no contagion, the dotted black lines the certainty equivalent returns in the model
with joint jumps. The results are based on the parameters given in Table 1.
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Figure 3: Model Mis-Speciation: certainty equivalent returns for equal market prices of
risk
The gures show the certainty equivalent returns as a function of the planning horizon
for the incomplete (upper panel) and complete market (lower panel) if the economy is
in the calm state (left column) and in the contagion state (right column), depending on
which model is used for portfolio planning. The solid blue lines and the dashed red lines
give the certainty equivalent returns n the calm and contagion state, respectively, if the
correct model is used. The dash-dotted green lines indicate the CERs if a model with no
contagion is used, the dotted black lines are the CERs if a model with joint jumps is used.
The results are based on parametrization 1 from Table 1 for which the market prices of
risk are equal in both states.
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Figure 4: Model Mis-Specication: certainty equivalent returns for equal equity risk premia
The gures show the certainty equivalent returns as a function of the planning horizon
for the incomplete (upper panel) and complete market (lower panel) if the economy is
in the calm state (left column) and in the contagion state (right column), depending on
which model is used for portfolio planning. The solid blue lines and the dashed red lines
give the certainty equivalent returns in the calm and contagion state, respectively, if the
correct model is used. The dash-dotted green lines indicate the CERs if a model with
no contagion is used, the dotted black lines are the CERs if a model with joint jumps is
used. The results are based on parametrization 2 from Table 1 for which the equity risk
premium is equal in both states.
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 = 10
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Figure 5: Model Mis-Specication: certainty equivalent returns for dierent values of 
The gures show the certainty equivalent returns for the complete market in case of model
mis-specication as a function of the planning horizon for dierent values of A = B = .
The solid blue lines and the dashed red lines give the certainty equivalent returns in the
calm and contagion state, respectively, if the correct model is used. The dash-dotted green
lines indicate the CERs if a model with no contagion is used, the dotted black lines are
the CERs if a model with joint jumps is used. The results are based on parametrization
2 (equal equity risk premia) from Table 1 where we have chosen  = 2;4;10 and thus
changed the jump intensities according to Table 3.
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